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One new concept that offers increased operational capability and agility is called distributed operations. This new concept has potential to offer increased combat capability in efficient packages utilizing joint interdependence to ensure survivability and sustainability. The concept is based on the utilization of ground combat units distributed across a battle space, but hooked into a distributed command and control network which facilitates supporting arms fires and logistics support to enable the unit to control a section of the battle space. The units can operate separately on the battlefield or coalesce into a larger conventional unit as needed.
While there is still discussion on the exact size and makeup of such a unit, along with the required training, it is the ability to support by fire and sustain any such force that appears to be the consistent points of operational employment friction. The command, control, and communications technology to support and sustain such a force is advanced enough to field equipment capable of supporting this concept. How the command and control network is structured to support the concept, however, may offer the biggest challenge. Distributed operations would appear to offer increased flexibility to national civilian leadership and combatant commanders by being useful in both conventional and unconventional combat.
Rapidly deployable, strategically responsive forces provide flexibility and responsiveness in support of national interests. The ability to project multi-dimensional power across a battle space allows combatant commanders to achieve operational surprise and possibly resolve an issue before major joint task forces are committed to a conventional conflict. This distributed force employment enables the seizing of multiple objectives simultaneously, which is a force multiplier in the opening phase of any forcible entry operations, and it complicates the enemy's ability to respond and defend. While there were no joint, interdependent capabilities per se during these two time periods, they both provide some insights for application today. First, the distributed operations concept has merit and application for both conventional and unconventional operations due to the flexibility inherent in the utilization of forces. Second, the concept is dependent on units that are well trained and well led. Third, history substantiates that fire support must be available to ensure survivability of the unit and ensure its effectiveness against larger enemy units. Fourth, logistics support to the unit in the field is critical to sustaining the force in the field. Lastly, modern, reliable technology is required to facilitate the concept and get it over the primary obstacles of command and control of fires and sustainment that hindered the effectiveness of earlier employments of distributed operations.
ASSUMPTIONS
To address the two critical friction points hampering distributed operations in the 21st 6 This path will increase joint fires situational awareness, efficiency in application of fires to the target, and reduce fratricide potential by each firing unit and end user being identified on a unified fires network in a collaborative manner.
Units will be networked so that whichever unit is in contact and requires fire support can leverage all joint fires capabilities to fight and win.
The joint Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC) currently advises priorities, plans, integrates, synchronizes, and coordinates fires from a central command perspective. 7 In its current form it does not control fires execution directly. Rather, it is a decentralized execution of fires that the FFCC monitors. This approach will need to be modified to include a more active participation in fires in a distributed operations environment. The FFCC would have to act as the senior fire support coordination center and control all fires being executed so that it could interject missions, make corrections, change priorities, and initiate check fires for potential fratricide situations. The FFCC must mature into a theater wide hub for fires planning and execution to facilitate total integration and synchronization of all joint fires assets.
The JBMC2 initiative, and associated technology, will enable access for distributed operations units in the field to access the JTF WARNET and for the FFCC to maintain visibility of these units. The joint fires initiative being developed by Joint Forces Command is the proper avenue to achieve coordinated interdependent joint fires in support of distributed operations. All
United States Services must continue their participation in these fire support and command and control initiatives to maximize the effectiveness of this developing system and leverage the interdependent fires capabilities and assets to support the distributed operations concept.
DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS LOGISTICS
Joint interdependent logistics is what will allow the distributed operations concept to fully mature into a combat multiplier. Throughout history logistics has constrained military operations more than any other battlefield operating system. To overcome this constraint, logistics must be operationally linked with maneuver to facilitate mission accomplishment and overcome the friction in getting the logistic support to the unit in the field over the last tactical mile. The logistics system must pursue interdependence to ensure collective efficiency and effectiveness. Distribution is the operational process of synchronizing all elements of a logistics system to deliver the correct item at the correct place at the correct time? To that end, the transformation end state in joint logistics is on focused logistics with in-transit visibility for just-intime delivery. 1 " These objectives reduce the requirement for large supply depots, ensure nothing is lost enroute, and reduces the reordering of not-received items that further bogs down the logistic system. The technology and tracking systems are being developed based on existing commercial off-the-shelf technology that will work well for items shipping from the United States into combat theater supply nodes run by the TSC. The logistical system packing of by unit support bundles and pallets is achieving further efficiencies for units in the field. This initiative is achieving some success today in Operation Iraqi Freedom and will continue to improve as all logistics organizations migrate to more collaborative networks and systems that facilitate end to end visibility of the logistics system to track assets. The fielding of newer technology will eventually make the process more efficient, user-friendly, and interdependent.
The capability to collaboratively order and then track logistical requests is one part of the solution to logistics for distributed operations. Just-in-time delivery and in-transit visibility will utilize embedded micro sensors, or radio tags, to track the items and could even be applied down to the tactical level. The Defense Logistics Agency is already making great strides in this arena by applying this technology to rations, parts, and consumables. However, most commercial applicators of the existing technology, like United Parcel Service, do not have the concerns for force protection and concealing locations that a military unit would be worried about. A correct combination of frequency bands, encryption, and tamper-proof tags should resolve this concern. Once the force protection and operational security challenges are resolved for "tagging" items, then distributed units in the field should be able to access the BCS3 network and get a status on their resupply.
The delivery to the unit in the field over the "last tactical mile" is even more challenging when the unit is actually involved in combat operations. The tried-and-true methods of vehicle and aviation will be applicable at times when a unit is conducting more conventional operations.
The helicopter, intratheater lift fixed-wing aircraft, and future vertical short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft will all have a place in the distributed operations logistics structure to ensure timely delivery to the unit executing combat operations. There will be times when these delivery platforms would not be preferred, either due to the enemy threat or the desire of the unit conducting distributed operations to maintain a low visual and aural signature to facilitate force protection and mission accomplishment. Filling this delivery gap will be either conventional parachute resupply or a new concept known as Joint Precision Aerial delivery (JPAD). " This concept involves the use of a parachute delivery system dropped with a high-altitude offset capable of maneuvering for accurate drop zone delivery. Such a delivery system would enable distributed operation units to stay afield longer by delivering critical items like ammunition, batteries, and food. The final decision on the size of distributed operations units will drive total requirement numbers for JPAD acquisition.
The logistics techniques, procedures, and technologies described above should have little to no adverse impact on joint operations. In fact, they support and reinforce the seven logistics principles of responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and survivability contained in Joint Publication 4-0.12 For example, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) already possesses assault support helicopters and C-130s for intratheater lift and tactical delivery. In addition, the FSSGs already contain aerial delivery platoons that can train up on the JPAD to facilitate aerial delivery and the new joint collaborative tracking systems should improve current Service logistics capability. The biggest negative will be the costs associated with obtaining new logistics tracking equipment, JPAD systems, and the training associated with the new equipment. These costs are inherent in the transition to a new warfighting concept and must be absorbed if the new distributed operations concept is to reach its potential agility and flexibility on a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield. These procurement costs can be offset by maximum utilization of joint interdependent air, vehicle, and parachute delivery assets. The assets procured by the Marine Corps could be utilized by joint forces or reciprocate joint interdependence for other Service units.
COURSES OF ACTION
The Marine Corps has postulated two potential courses of action that are possible for distributed operations. The first course of action would be a "go it alone" strategy in developing the concept, doctrine, and equipment to facilitate the employment of distributed operations.
This course of action would offer Service flexibility, joint redundancy in capability, and independence of action. However, this course of action would prove very expensive in funds, manpower, and duplicates efforts in some developmental arenas. It would also be counter to the movement to joint interoperability being embraced by all Services and mandated by the These two support challenges are being dealt with directly and addressed via joint programs so that interdependence can be effectively leveraged for the benefit of the Marine Corps and the combatant commander. Distributed operations is a viable joint warfighting concept whose time has arrived. Once the internal Marine Corps discussions over unit size, training, and missions are settled, the jointly interdependent fire support, logistics, and command and control systems will be available for the units to plug into and execute the concept. The critical issue before the Marine Corps is that it must stay engaged in the development and fielding of these new joint interdependent enabling systems and doctrine. If the Marine Corpsstays the course in that regard, distributed operations will become a reality and a new joint warfighting concept will mature and become a useful tool for the nation.
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